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1. In recent years governments and donor agencies have devoted considerable
resources to efforts to improve the management of communal grazing
lands. Range and livestock projects have been designed to address such
familiar pastoral problems as endemic overgrazing of rangelands, often
leading to permanent degradation of vegetation, soils, and water resources,
and reduced livestock productivity, adversely affecting the welfare of
rural people. Many explanations have been offered for overgrazing and
resource degradation. These include rapid human population growth;
technological changes such as deep boreholes, which in some areas have
overridden the natural systems constraints to the unchecked growth of
herds; and social and economic changes in part resulting in the decline
of traditional institutions that may have provided mechanisms for regulating
or controlling access to rangelands (Bennett et al, 1986).
2. Whatever the complex of factors which have led to range degradation in
Africa, policy-makers and project designers very often see at least part
of the solution in land tenure reform. New land tenure rules are seen as
essential to correcting the problems associated with the perceived open
access, free-for-all communal range use. This has led to a great variety
of reform experiments, including individualization, as in the case of the
Tribal Grazing Land Program in Botswana, group ranches in Kenya and
elsewhere, as well as attempts to develop cooperative grazing systems,
such as grazing associations, and the creation of administrative apparatus
for controlling livestock number and movements through grazing permits
(Bennett et al, 1986; Lawry, 1983; Oxby, 1981; Galaty, 1980).
Grazing associations in Lesotho
3. Recent range policy in Lesotho has emphasized a dual strategy. On the
one hand, the strategy is to invest greater control over local management
decisions in grazing associations, and on the other, to develop the
institutional capacity for better administrative regulation of grazing,
principally by reinforcing the role of the chieftainship in range management
matters. This paper gives emphasis to the grazing association approach.
4. Grazing associations are not indigenous forms of grazing management in
Lesotho. Rather, they have been promoted by govenment and international
donor agencies, usually as part of area-based range and livestock projects —
The grazing association evaluated here, at Sehlabathebe in Qacha's Nek
district in eastern Lesotho, was established in 1983 as one component of
a USAID-funded range improvement program in the 33,000 hectare
Sehlabathebe area. Although the association was formed at the initiative
of government and project staff, it would be incorrect to deduce that the
community was unreceptive to the kinds of interventions offered by
government. In fact, the assoication has been relatively successful in
attracting and keeping paying members (about 50 percent of Sehlabathebe
stockholders were members in 1985).
5. High levels of local support have been achieved because the Government
of Lesotho's (GOD program of assistance has brought tangible benefits
to stockholders. Local grazing patterns were adjusted to give Sehlabathebe
(an area comprising 10 villages sharing a single watershed) exclusive year-
round grazing rights to an extensive nearby high mountain cattle post area.
While this step provided the Sehalabathebe grazing association with
exclusive control over a region with which a year-round grazing regime
could be planned and administered, it also extinguished histroical use rights
to high mountain pastures held by stockholders in neighbouring communities.
This, of course, pleased Sehlabathebe residents. Grazing pressure was
significantly reduced at no cost to themselves. Outsiders, of course, were
left with reduced grazing and have continued to press demands for some
form of relief.
6. A constitution defining the rights and privileges of members and a policy
making and management structure was drawn up by the project. Briefly,
the association is governed by an executive committee made up of two
elected representatives for each village, plus the village chiefs or headmen.
The executive committee is responsible, among other things, for
administering a grazing management plan which provides for the seasonal
rotation of livestock between winter grazing areas near the villages and
summer grazing areas in the surrounding mountains. Livestock found grazing
in violation of the plan are subject to being impounded by any of ten range
riders (lipalami), who are local villagers paid by the association to enforce
the grazing rules. Owners of impounded livestock must pay trespass fines
before they can regain possession of their animals.
7. The grazing management plan, though not universally adopted, has brought
about clearly beneficial changes in the grazing regime. Range technicians
generally agree that grazing conditions in the village areas are much
improved, and that much more winter forage is available for livestock
than would normally have been the case. However, there is some evidence
to suggest that many stockholders adhere to the rotation scheme because
they fear their livestock will be impounded, and not necessarily because
they think the plan is a good idea. Approximately 30% of cattle owners
had some stock impounded in each of the last two summer grazing seasons.
It is unlikely that the rotational scheme could continue in any meaningful
way in the absence of a vigorous enforcement program.
8. At the start of the project, it had been assumed that after a period of fairly
intensive initial assitance, the grazing association would be able to handle
rule-making, range management, and enforcement functions on its own.
From the outset, project staff were meant to provide extension assistance
only. In practice, the extension role often shaded into a leadership role,
in which project staff acted as managers of association affairs, particularly
on technical aspects of the grazing rotation, and decisively in providing
administrative assitance to the enforcement program. On the whole, this
kind of project role was welcomed by stockholders who came to see the
project as an even-handed outside authority not subject to the kinds of
intra-village conflicts which so often undermine village cooperative schemes.
9. A program of project-supported social science research at Sehlabathebe
has given particular emphasis to identifying social and economic factors
that either contribute to, or detract from, local self-management of grazing
resources. Factors weighing against cooperation predominate, and some
of them are summarized below.
10. Stockholders pursue highly diverse livestock production strategies.
Livestock management practices vary with such household demographic
characteristics as age, sex, and residential status of the household head.
About 30% of households are headed by women, and another 30% are headed
by men who are absent for work, mainly South Africa. Households short
on male herding labor and male management are less able to adopt many
of the more intensive range management practices required by the plan.
11. Likewise, economic interest in livestock and livestock and range
improvement varies significantly among households. Only about 16%
of households cite livestock production as their principal source of cash
income, though 84% of households own livestock. Households more
dependent upon remittances (and remittances are the principal cash income
source for 50% of households) are less likely to belong to the grazing
association, to feed fodder and mineral supplements to their livestock,
to breed with improved stock and decisively, to own cattle posts—the
bases of operation in the mountain pastures. For many in this group,
adoption of the grazing plan requires that they make arrangements to
share cattle posts belonging to others. This involves new costs which
many seek to avoid by keeping their stock in the village year-round.
Avoidance of these kinds of costs partially explains the high number of
trespass cases.
12. A general policy implication is that as households vary in their economic
intersts in livestock, and in their management practices generally, so
they vary in their willingness and ability to adopt certain aspects of any
communal management scheme. The dilemma is one of achieving
coordinated, common behavior in an environment characterized by producer
heterogeneity.
13. Despite this heterogeneity and the challenges it presents to communal
action, it can be argued that many of the plan's provisions are not onerous,
2/and can be adopted at reasonable cost by most people.- The policy problem
then shifts to that of the viability of the grazing association in managing
grazing, including enforcing rules, apart from any active involvement
by government authorities.
14. Stockholders are skeptical about the ability of the executive committee
to sustain the managment and control programs established with project
assistance. In response to a question in one survey, 54% of the respondents
did not think that the grazing association could function without continuing
leadership and management assistance from government and project staff.
Only 12% felt that it could continue, while the remaining 34% were not
sure or had no opinion. Comments made by respondents suggested that
their skepticism is grounded in a sense that people are disinclined to
cooperate on communal management endeavors. Stockholders assume
that many people would rather not take the trouble to adjust their behavior
to conform to a community plan, or that for many adjustment is too costly.
15. This skepticism is reinforced by the absence of a strong tradition of local
self-management of resource use. The role of village chiefs in regulating
grazing was very modest, and was limited to setting aside winter reserve
areas in the villages, known as leboella. The ability of the chiefs to even
manage leboella has become much diminished, because of political and
social changes affecting the chieftainship but also because leboella is
subject to the same kinds of pressures that threaten the grazing plan.
16. But more importantly, many stockholders doubt the ability of the executive
committee to carry forward the range management program in an even
handed way. The committee is made up of large holders, who have very
limited experience in collective decision-making and are subject to factional
infighting. Also, executive committee members are often perceived as
acting only in their own interests. And because people are seen as
inherently "uncooperative", many stockholders doubt the ability of the
executive committee, made up of neighbors and social equals ("equals"
in the sense that higher social position or status does not normally entail
the ability to command others), to enforce rules without the active backing
of project staff. Project staff, as outsiders and public officials, are seen
as socially neutral and technically competent. Thus, a second dilemma
presents itself. The grazing assoication does not possess the kind of social
authority and technical legitimacy necessary to effectively enforce grazing
rules.
17. The inability of the grazing association to manage the grazing plan
independent of government assistance has led the GOL and the donor
to prolong the period of project technical assistance to the association.
In fact, policy toward grazing associations is coming to assume a more
or less permanent official role in local level range management. The
role of government officials would be one of working directly with grazing
associations, providing technical legitimacy to range plans, and backstopping
locally managed enforcement programs.
18. Reliance upon government authority, however, is not always feasible,
or desirable. In light of severe staff limits, only a small number of areas
could receive the kind of management assistance this approach would
require. Indeed, a principal rationale for the original emphasis on grazing
associations was the supposed reduction in demands upon limited technical
staff that would follow upon locally managed rangelands.
19. The relationship between government staff and communities is itself not
always an easy one. At Sehlabathebe, the project staff have not adopted
an authoritarian attitude toward range control. Rather, they have provided
backing to the enforcement activities of the association, and have prodded
the leadership into action at critical junctures in the grazing program.
20. By working closely with the leadership, the project staff have become
sensitive to the very real limits stockholders face in adopting some
unpopular or unrealistic aspects of the grazing plan. Hence, the project
staff have not pressed for enforcement of those rules which might have
met with widespread resistance. Clearly, the relationship between the
project and the association is subtle one. It is a relationship that is not
easily formalized.
Policy implications
21. Many cooperative livestock and grazing schemes flounder because of
incorrect assumptions made about the social, political and legal status
of the cooperative organization, especially with respect to its ability
to control the behavior of its members. Whether it be a group ranch,
a marketing cooperative, or a grazing association, it is often assumed
that the cooperative organization will possess more social authority than
is in fact realistic to expect.
22. In Lesotho, the social and economic conditions for effective local
cooperative action in range managment are not usually present. Diverse
livestock and range management strategies make widespread adoption
of a communal management scheme problematic. Grazing associations
lack the social authority to enforce even modest controls.
23. The relative success of the Sehlabathebe program has been the result
of a collaborative effort between the grazing association and the project
range officers. While the project's presence has been decisive in keeping
the association committed to the enforcement of regulations, project
personnel, had they had the sole direct responsibility for implementing
the program, would not have been able to achieve equivalent levels of
rule adoption through directly administered range controls. This suggests,
in situations characterized by weak local organizations combined with
the need to ajust the program objectives and regulations to local conditions,
collaborative local organization-government management models may
provide a better way of coping with the limitations inherent in the separate
approaches.
24. Range management projects that anticipate a role for a cooperative
organization of livestock holders should make a particular effort to
understand the social setting for cooperative resource management. A
critical issue will be the ability of the group to regulate the behavior
of its members —in this case to enforce grazing rules.
25. It is not possible to provide a checklist of the necessary ingredients for
successful cooperative action. Any new, unfamiliar set of circumstances
will require evaluation with an appropriate input from social scientists.
The experience in Lesotho, however, suggests that some of the following
factors be borne in mind.
(i) At the household level, the variety of range use and management
strategies should be identified. Greater heterogeneity may complicate
implementation of the plan, but prior knowledge of the variety of
management strategies can help in designing plans that account for
the constraints to adoption faced by certain categories of producers.
For instance, new grazing regimes will often involve adjustments
in herding patterns, and may increase herding costs for some
stockowner groups. It might be appropriate for the local organization
to supply herding services to those adversely affected. Likewise,
it may be appropriate to exempt disadvantaged categories of producers
from certain plan provisions, where this would not detract from the
overall viability of the plan. Questions of the distribution of costs
and benefits among groups will continually present themselves, and
will challenge the cohesiveness of the organization. Outside staff
can be of assistance in offering disinterested solutions perceived
as fair by the affected groups.
(ii) As a rule, no plan should impose a radical new grazing scheme. Rather,
improvements should be made to what exists through incremental
adjustments. Information should be gathered on existing grazing
patterns, and existing patterns should, wherever possible, be preserved
or improved upon in the new plan. In many communal systems, grazing
is "partitioned" between, for instance, more intensive dairy and draft
operations near settlements and more extensive grazing at outposts
in distant open pastures (Oakerson, 1984). The economic and
management logic of partitioning rules should be accounted for, and
should provide the point of departure for new plans. Herd sharing
or entrustment arrangements (such as mafisa in Lesotho and Botswana)
might act to get stock into the hands of those who can provide more
intensive management, thereby easing adoption of the plan. The
continuing effectiveness of such arrangements needs to be considered.
(iii) If success of the plan rests on adoption of new rules, the ability of
the group, association, or the government to enforce the rules
realistically must be carefully assessed. Rules that impose costs
on stockholders without the promise of clear, immediate benefits
will be resisted. This, of course, applies to all aspects of range and
livestock programs. But there is a very real danger that communal
range management programs, with their preeminent emphasis on
range and vegetation condition lose sight of the production goals
and constraints of livestock owners, which are principally social and
economic in character.
FOOTNOTES
- Grazing association programs in Lesotho have usually been associated with
area-based projects, collaborative efforts between the Ministry of Agriculture
and Marketing and donor agencies. Recent examples, in addition to
Sehlabathebe, have been grazing associations at Thaba Tseka (promoted
with technical assistance from the Canadian International Development
Agency) and Mphaki (European Economic Community).
2/
- Enforcement of some generally unpopular provisions of the grazing plan
has not been pressed by the project. For instance, a requirment that all
sheep and goats be brought to village areas in the winter ran up against
strong local concerns about the destructiveness of small stock to gardens
and cattle grazing. The rule went unenforced by the range riders, and was
eventually dropped following formal decision by the executive committee.
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